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A TALE OF TWO TEXTUALISTS: A CRITICAL 
COMPARISON OF JUSTICES BLACK AND SCALIA 
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT* 
The idea that Justices Hugo Black and Antonin Scalia have anything in 
common jurisprudentially is counterintuitive. Justice Black is associated 
with the progressive social and economic legislation symbolized by the 
New Deal and with judicial activism in protecting the poor and disen-
franchised.1 He is beloved by many liberals as a champion of individual 
rights, especially freedom of speech and of the press. In contrast, Justice 
Scalia is revered by conservatives as a true believer-combating the rising 
tide of liberalism, big government, and judicial activism-set on restoring 
traditional notions of federalism and judicial restraint.2 Any effort to 
liken these two Justices makes both liberals and conservatives recoil. 
* Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and 
Mary. B.A. Yale University; M.Sc. London School of Economics; J.D. University of 
Chicago. I am grateful for the encouragement and helpful comments on earlier drafts 
I received from Marc Arkin, Erwin Chemerinsky, George Cochran, Neal Devins, Jill 
Fisch, Tracy Higgins, Michael Herz, Sandy Levinson, Chip Lupu, Tracey Maclin, John 
McGinnis, Peter Shane, Bill Treanor, Steve Wermiel, and Ron Wright. 
1 See generally HowARD BALL & PHILLIP J. CooPER, OF PowER AND RIGHT: 
HuGo BLACK, WILLIAM 0. DouGLAS, AND AMERICA's CoNSTITUTIONAL REVOLU-
TION 3-11 (1992) (examining the collaborative relationship between Justices Black 
and Douglas during their years on the Supreme Court together); GERALD T. DuNNE, 
HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 177-439 (1977) (examining Justice 
Black's judicial philosophy and decision making); JoHN P. FRANK, MR. JusTICE 
BLACK: THE MAN AND His OPINIONS (1949) (sketching the biography of Justice 
Black and presenting some of his economic regulation and equal protection opinions 
from his first 10 years on the Court); MARK SILVERSTEIN, CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITHS: 
FELIX FRANKFURTER, HUGO BLACK, AND THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAK-
ING 90-209 (1984) (exploring Justice Black's political values and his move toward 
absolutism in due process and First Amendment decision making). 
2 See generally Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., The Conservatism of Justice Scalia, 105 PoL. 
Sci. Q. 1 (1990) (arguing that Justice Scalia's record on the Court reflects his belief in 
judicial restraint and deference to majoritarian decision making); Symposium, The 
Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 12 CARDozo L. REv. 1583 (1991) (containing 
essays describing and critiquing Justice Scalia's constitutional jurisprudence by Judge 
Alex Kozinski, Robert A. Burt, David A. Strauss, Mark V. Thshnet, Richard D. Fried-
man, Walter Hellerstein, Larry Kramer, Peter B. Edelman, Toby Golick, Stephen 
25 
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Nevertheless, this Article seeks to improve our understanding of Jus-
tices Black's and Scalia's approaches to constitutional adjudication by 
examining for the first time3 how each would evaluate the other's textual-
ism.4 It reveals their significant methodological and substantive similari-
ties, including their comparably intense and persistent proclamations of 
fidelity to the constitutional text. This Article will show, however, that 
textualism only partly explains both Justices' approaches to constitutional 
adjudication. It suggests that, despite the efforts of both Justices to iden-
tify an objective meaning for each part of the Constitution, neither Justice 
has avoided basing his interpretation of the document on values not 
grounded in the text. Both have relied heavily on their personal and 
political judgments regarding the role of the federal judiciary, which 
reflect changing attitudes toward judicial activism and restraint. 
The first two parts of this Article describe the striking similarities 
between Justices Black and Scalia. Part I examines their similar interpre-
tive methodologies, including their common use of bright line tests 
designed to promote judicial restraint and to impose limitations on legis-
lative power. Part II compares the two Justices' similar substantive posi-
tions regarding the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, 
substantive due process, separation of powers, and, to a limited extent, 
freedom of speech and search and seizure. 
Part III explores perhaps the most striking substantive differences 
between Justices Black and Scalia-their differing attitudes toward free-
dom of religion cases and tradition (or longstanding majoritarian prac-
Wizner, and George Kannar); David P. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black 
Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia over 
Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 FoRDHAM L. REv. 895, 899 (1993) (briefly 
contrasting Justice Black's liberal and Justice Scalia's conservative textualism); Jean 
M. Meaux, Comment, Justice Scalia and Judicial Restraint: A Conservative Resolution 
of Conflict Between Individual and State, 62 TuL. L. REv. 225 (1987) (exploring Jus-
tice Scalia's theory of judicial restraint through his pre-appointment writings and deci-
sions, and through his voting during the 1986 Term). 
3 Although both Justices have been compared to other justices, no detailed com-
parison of the two has been undertaken. Cf BALL & CooPER, supra note 1, at 3-11 
(comparing the jurisprudence of Justices Black and Douglas); Brisbin, Jr., supra note 
2, at 25-27 (tracing many of Justice Scalia's views back to those of Justice Felix Frank-
furter); Peter B. Edelman, Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence and the Good Society: Shades 
of Felix Frankfurter and the Harvard Hit Parade of the 1950s, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 
1799, 1799-1801 (1991) (drawing parallels between Justices Scalia and Frankfurter); 
Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics 
Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1047, 1074-81 (1990) (exploring the role of 
morality in Justice Scalia's decision making). 
4 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT & THOMAS D. RowE, CoNSTITUTIONAL THEORY: 
ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 39-40 (1992) (defining "textualists" as those SCholars 
and jurists who view the constitutional text as the only or primary legitimate source of 
constitutional decision making). 
1994] A TALE OF TWO TEXTUALISTS 27 
tices) as a source of constitutional meaning. This part finds that the 
Justices' respective judgments about judicial activism and restraint illumi-
nate their disagreement about the appropriate role of tradition and 
majoritarianism in constitutional adjudication. This conflict is reflected in 
the contrast between Justice Black's tendency to follow his reading of the 
text, regardless of the consequences, and Justice Scalia's use of judicial 
restraint as a default rule to supplement the constitutional text. Conse-
quently, Justice Scalia has found Justice Black's position in freedom of 
religion cases too activist because it enhanced judicial power at the 
expense of tradition, while Justice Black would have likely denounced 
Justice Scalia's use of tradition to defeat individual rights claims as sacri-
ficing the constitutional text to enhance majoritarianism and judicial 
restraint. 
Part IV suggests that textualism provides an incomplete picture of Jus-
tices Black's and Scalia's constitutional interpretation. It shows that, 
despite their protestations to the contrary, both Justices Scalia and Black 
ultimately have relied on something outside the constitutional text to 
interpret it. This part suggests that in constitutional adjudication Justices 
Black and Scalia have depended primarily on their political and personal 
judgments regarding the proper role of the judiciary,5 which reflect 
changed attitudes about judicial activism and restraint. 
Part V suggests that Justices Black's and Scalia's reliance on concepts 
or judgments outside the constitutional text exposes a potential problem 
with textualism in general. Textualism may fail fully to explain constitu-
5 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DoRF, ON READING THE 
CoNSTITUTION 15 (1991) (asserting that readers of the Constitution, including judges, 
cannot avoid making some value judgments when interpreting it); Erwin Chemerin-
sky, The Supreme Court 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 
HARV. L. REv. 43, 94-96, 100-04 (1989) (discussing the inevitable role of personal 
value choices in judicial decisions and proposing that open debate about such choices 
should replace the current practice of hiding or masking them); Michael J. Gerhardt, 
The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEo. WASH. 
L. REv. 68, 138 (1991) (proposing increased candor among the justices); Richard Kay, 
Preconstitutional Rules, 42 0Hro ST. L.J. 204,206 (1981) (arguing that deciding consti-
tutional questions involves considerations outside the text that constitute "preconsti-
tutional rules"); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 11 VA. L. REv. 669, 718-19 (1991) (arguing that one's 
approach to constitutional interpretation depends heavily on one's moral and political 
judgments about the role of the judiciary in our society). Of course, the idea that 
people cannot read a text without drawing on or imputing values from outside of the 
text is not unique to constitutional scholarship. See GERHARDT & RowE, supra note 
4, at 64-94 (describing and providing excerpts from articles by Owen Fiss, Sanford 
Levinson, and Stanley Fish about the relationship between a reader's values and a 
legal text); Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1325, 1325-47 (1984) (arguing 
that there is no legal text apart from the conventions and values of the reading 
community). 
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tional adjudication because it neither recognizes nor makes allowances 
for the inevitability of relying on moral and political judgments about 
judicial activism and restraint that turn on factors outside the text of the 
Constitution. These factors include a justice's professional and personal 
experiences, character, and the perceived need to subvert or compromise 
views to preserve fragile coalitions on the Court. 
I. JusTicEs BLACK's AND ScALIA's CoMMON METHODOLOGY 
Justices Black's and Scalia's descriptions of the methodology of consti-
tutional interpretation are strikingly similar in two respects. First, they 
share the view that an unrestrained judiciary bent on deciding cases as it 
pleases is a serious threat to democratic government and to the sanctity 
of the written Constitution. Second, they agree on the specific solution of 
fidelity to the text to combat this common enemy. I consider each simi-
larity in turn. 
A. The Common Enemy 
Justices Black and Scalia have each argued that judicial abuse of discre-
tion poses a grave danger to our democratic institutions and to the pri-
macy of the written Constitution. This danger, in their views, necessitates 
a systematic theory of constitutional interpretation by which to restrain 
judges. For example, Justice Black especially feared "the rewriting of the 
Constitution by judges under the guise of interpreting it. "6 Consequently, 
he rejected the faith "that the Supreme Court will reach a faster and 
more desirable resolution of our problems than the legislative or execu-
tive branches of government."7 Rather, he believed that individual liber-
ties were not secure when the judiciary is restrained "only by its own 
ideas of right and wrong. "8 He was further concerned that, left 
unchecked, some judges might use their power in ways "inimical to free-
dom and good government."9 
Similarly, Justice Scalia has complained that far too many judicial deci-
sions have been made "not on the basis of what the Constitution origi-
nally meant, but on the basis of what the judges currently thought it 
desirable for it to mean."1° For Justice Scalia, such unprincipled decision 
making can threaten individual liberties, because its promise of 
expanding individual liberties is illusory.U According to Justice Scalia, 
unrestrained judges are just as likely to contract individual rights as they 
6 Huoo L. BLACK, A CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH 14 (1968). 
7 !d. at 11. 
8 /d. at 12. 
9 !d. 
10 Antonio Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 852 (1989). 
11 !d. at 855. 
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are to expand them.12 In short, for Justice Scalia, "the main danger in 
judicial interpretation of the Constitution ... is that the judges will mis-
take their own predilections for the law. Avoiding this error is the hard-
est part of being a conscientious judge."13 
B. The Common Solution 
Justices Black and Scalia also agree on the appropriate solution for 
restraining unprincipled judicial interference with legitimate majoritarian 
decision making. Both have espoused a theory of constitutional interpre-
tation that requires judges to hew as closely as possible to the constitu-
tional text. Where the text is clear, this approach requires adhering to its 
plain meaning. Where the text is unclear, this approach requires adher-
ing to its original meaning. 
Justice Black believed that the constitutionality of the exercise of gov-
ernmental power should be determined by the language and history of 
the Constitution, not by the justices' assessment of its reasonableness.14 
Further, in response to his colleagues who had routinely balanced govern-
mental interests against individual rights, 15 Justice Black asserted that the 
12 Id. 
13 /d. at 863. Interestingly, neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Black has used the 
term "countermajoritarian difficulty" to refer to the problem that both have identified 
as the central dilemma in constitutional adjudication. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROus BRANCH: THE SuPREME CouRT AT THE BAR OF PoLITICS 12 
(1962). Nevertheless, this classic phrasing captures the essence of their common tar-
get or enemy-unprincipled or self-interested judicial interference with the decisions 
of the people's duly elected representatives. See generally GERHARDT & RowE, 
supra note 4, at 3-14 (describing the relationship between the development of Ameri-
can constitutional theory and "the countermajoritarian difficulty"). 
14 For example, Justice Black explained: 
Our written Constitution means ... that where a power is not in terms granted or 
not necessary and proper to exercise a power that is granted, no such power 
exists in any branch of government-executive, legislative or judicial. Thus, it is 
the language and history that are the crucial factors which influence me in inter-
preting the Constitution-not reasonableness or desirability as determined by 
justices of the Supreme Court. 
BLACK, A CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 6, at 8. 
15 Justice Black was very critical of Justices Frankfurter's and Harlan's balancing of 
competing interests in individual rights cases, especially in the context of freedom of 
speech. See BICKEL, supra note 13, at 93-97 (discussing Justice Black's absolutist con-
stitutional interpretations); John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles 
of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482 
(1975) (examining the flag desecration cases in search of a coherent constitutional 
test); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE 
L.J. 877, 912-16 (1963) (discussing "ad hoc balancing" and "absolute" tests in the con-
text of the Supreme Court's failure to develop a satisfactory theory of the First 
Amendment); Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 
1424 (1962) (arguing that balancing has appropriately emerged as the test in First 
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framers of the Bill of Rights had resolved all of the necessary balancing of 
constitutional liberties in 1791: "Where conflicting values exist in the field 
of individual liberties protected by the Constitution, that document set-
tles the conflict."16 Yet, none of this meant that the Constitution was a 
dead letter. Rather, Justice Black saw it as "a living document ... con-
tain[ing] within itself a lasting recognition that it should be changed to 
meet new demands, new conditions, new times. It provides the means to 
achieve these changes through the amendment process in Article V."17 
Justice Scalia expressed similar sentiments concerning the importation 
of judges' personal preferences into constitutional adjudication. His pre-
ferred alternative, however, is to substitute the text, including its original 
meaning, for a judge's personal preferences. Echoing Justice Black, Jus-
tice Scalia urged in a 1990 interview with the Jerusalem Post: 
Judges should be restricted to the text in front of them. . . . Accord-
ing to my judicial philosophy, I feel bound not by what I think the 
tradition is, but by what the text and tradition actually say. The Con-
stitution is an anchor. I don't need it to create change. It's a rock to 
hold on to.18 
For Justice Scalia, a judge's task is "'not to determine what seems like 
good policy at the present time, but to ascertain the meaning of the 
text."' 19 
Moreover, Justice Scalia has acknowledged that, where the plain mean-
ing of the text is not dispositive, he relies on the original understanding or 
Amendment cases despite objections from absolutists like Justice Black); Wallace 
Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 
CAL. L. REv. 821 (1962) (critiquing Franz's Article and the trend toward balancing). 
In Konigsberg v. State Bar, Justice Harlan balanced the kind of speech involved 
against the state's interest. in regulating it in order to sustain the state's denial of bar 
admission to an applicant who had refused to answer questions about Communist 
Party membership. 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (rejecting Justice Black's argument that the 
First Amendment provided absolute protection to "freedom of speech"). In Bridges 
v. California, Justice Black explicitly rejected the Frankfurter-Harlan balancing 
approach to freedom of speech. 314 U.S. 252, 263-67, 269-71 (1941). 
16 Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865, 879 (1960). 
17 BLACK, A CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 6, at 21; see also Black, The Bill 
of Rights, supra note 16, at 879 (stating that the balance between competing values in 
the field of individual liberties "should not be changed without constitutional amend-
ments by the people in the manner provided by the people"). 
18 Dan Izenberg, Clinging to the Constitution, JERUSALEM PosT, Feb. 19, 1990 
(quoting Justice Scalia). 
19 George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 
1297, 1303 (1990) (quoting Antonin Scalia, Remarks at the 24th Australian Legal 
Convention 12 (Sept. 21, 1987)). 
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meaning of the Constitution20 because it "establishes a historical criterion 
that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge him-
self."21 He prefers originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation 
because it is "more compatible with the nature and purpose of a Consti-
tution in a democratic system."22 For Justice Scalia, it is the democratic 
political process, not particular constitutional guarantees, that ensures 
that the law reflects contemporary values. In his view, the role of consti-
tutional guarantees is to prevent contemporary majorities from changing 
the law-short of amending the Constitution-in ways that are incompat-
ible with the values embodied in the original text.23 
For both Justices, there is a single, immutable, judicially discoverable 
meaning for each part of the Constitution. Justice Scalia has written that 
the Constitution is "an enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable 
through the usual devices familiar to those learned in the law."24 By 
"immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the 
time,"25 a judge may discover the underlying values contained in the Con-
stitution. For Justice Scalia, unless judges interpret the text in light of this 
historical context, the Constitution is meaningless.26 Similarly, Justice 
Black asserted that "'in the construction of the language of the Constitu-
tion ... we are to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the condition of 
the men who framed that instrument."'27 In his epilogue to A Constitu-
tional Faith, Justice Black emphasized that the meaning and promise of 
the Constitution cannot be understood apart from the unique historical 
circumstances in which the Constitution was framed. For him, clarifying 
20 Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, supra note 10, at 852 (citing with approval 
Chief Justice Taft's opinion for the Court in Myers v. United States, 222 U.S. 52 
(1926)). 
21 Id. at 864. 
22 Id. at 862. 
23 According to Justice Scalia, 
constitutional guarantees ... prevent the law from reflecting certain changes in 
original values that the society adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally 
undesirable. Or, more precisely, to require the society to devote to the subject 
the long and hard consideration required for a constitutional amendment before 
those particular values can be set aside. 
I d. 
24 Id. at 854. 
25 Id. at 856. 
26 Antonin Scalia, Is There an Unwritten Constitution?, 12 HARV. J.L. & Pus. 
PoL'Y 1, 1 (1989) ("In this way, the written Constitution encompasses a whole history 
of meaning in the words contained in the Constitution, without which the Constitu-
tion itself is meaningless."). 
27 BLACK, A CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 6, at 8 (quoting Justice Miller in 
Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1889)). 
32 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:25 
this historical understanding of the document required taking each word 
in it seriously.28 
C. The Common Outcomes 
In practice, both Justices Black and Scalia have largely rejected prece-
dent as a legitimate source of constitutional decision making. For both 
Justices, precedent that conflicts with the plain or original meaning of the 
constitutional text is not "law" of the same order as the primary sources 
of constitutional interpretation.29 Precedent adds a gloss to the constitu-
tional text that should be the ultimate touchstone in every constitutional 
case. Moreover, the strength of their convictions in the correctness or 
accuracy of their constitutional visions has emboldened them in urging 
the Court to set aside any precedent that conflicts with their approaches 
to constitutional interpretation.3° Consequently, Justices Black and 
28 /d. at 65-66. "[T)he Constitution is my legal bible; its plan of our government is 
my plan and its destiny my destiny. I cherish every word of it, from the first to the 
last, and I personally deplore even the slightest deviation from its least important 
commands." /d. at 66. Such religious imagery is also not unusual to Justice Scalia, a 
devout Roman Catholic, who has conceded, for example, that legal views are "inevita-
bly affected by moral and theological perceptions." Antonin Scalia, Morality, Prag-
matism, and the Legal Order, 9 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 123, 123 (1986). Thus, he 
has found that the keys for being a good Catholic and a good jurist are the same: 
"'being strong enough to obey'" the relevant law. William Kramer, Justice Scalia 
Praises the "Differentness" of Catholics, L.A. DAILY J., June 1, 1987, at 4 (quoting 
Justice Scalia). Similarly, he has explained that, as a judge, '" "[y]ou must apply laws 
you don't like and you don't interject personal biases."'" Kannar, supra note 19, at 
1319 n.113 (quoting Dixon, BC Press Grills Scalia, THE KINGSMAN (Brooklyn College 
student newspaper), Oct. 23, 1985, at 5 (quoting Justice Scalia)); see also id. at 1309-20 
(tracing the relationship between Roman Catholicism, particularly the "Baltimore 
Catechism," and Justice Scalia's constitutional jurisprudence). 
29 Cf Robert A. Burt, Precedent and Authority in Antonin Scalia's Jurisprudence, 
12 CARDozo L. REv. 1685, 1689 (1991) (describing the hierarchy of Justice Scalia's 
sources for constitutional decision making); Maurice Kelman, The Forked Path of Dis-
sent, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 227,251 (maintaining that Justice Black tended to reject any 
precedent that conflicted with his reading of the text or its original meaning). Profes-
sor Levinson has likened this conception of constitutional interpretation to Protes-
tantism, which has tended to believe that the Bible (and not its subsequent 
interpretation) is the source of divine revelation. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CoNSTITU-
TIONAL FAITH 27-30 (1988). 
30 Indeed, both Justices have developed reputations for their refusals to second-
guess themselves and for their stubbornness in opposing criticism. See, e.g., JAMES F. 
SrMON, THE ANTAGONISTs: Huoo BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CrviL LIBER-
TIES rN MoDERN AMERICA 155 (1989) (noting that Justice Black not only failed to 
show any remorse whatsoever regarding his most controversial opinion upholding the 
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, but also that his defense of 
his position grew bolder over time); Kelman, supra note 29, at 251 (suggesting that 
Justice Black "did not retreat from his pet notions no matter how often or forcefully 
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Scalia have each argued that any precedent deemed wrongly decided or 
erroneously reasoned should be overruled.31 To expose the error of a 
prior decision a justice need only demonstrate that it deviates from the 
plain or original meaning of the Constitution. 
In fact, no two justices in this century have called for overruling more 
precedents than Justices Black and Scalia.32 For example, no one on the 
Court during Justice Black's thirty-four years dissented more often or 
urged more overrulings than he did.33 His most notable requests for 
overrulings occurred in cases involving freedom of speech,34 incorpora-
tion of the Bill of Rights,35 reapportionment,36 and the right to counsel.37 
Remarkably, in roughly a fifth of the time Justice Black spent on the 
his views were dismissed by the Court-not even in cases where the official jurispru-
dence could be made to yield the same results as his own ideas"). Similarly, Justice 
Scalia has not hesitated to belittle or to berate those of his colleagues who disagree 
with him. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. 
Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (likening the Court's allegiance to its 
twenty-year old Lemon test for evaluating Establishment Clause challenges to "some 
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles 
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried [stalking] our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence once again, frightening little children and school attorneys"); Burnham 
v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 614 n.3 (1990) (commenting that "one can only mar-
vel at Justice Brennan's assertion"); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 n.2, 
124 n.4, 125 n.5, 127 n.6 (1989) (referring to Justice Brennan's dissent as "absurd" and 
"nonsense"). 
31 Cf Gerhardt, supra note 5, at 122, 124-25 (describing Justice Scalia's approach 
to constitutional stare decisis); Kelman, supra note 29, at 251-52 (describing Justice 
Black's approach to constitutional stare decisis). 
32 As one might expect, such argumentation reflects each Justice's considerable 
self-confidence, refusal to second-guess his own judgment, and readiness to denounce 
the error of his colleagues. See discussion supra note 30. 
33 See Kelman, supra note 29, at 251. 
34 See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) 
Goining in Justice Douglas's concurrence, explicitly calling for the overruling of Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1951)); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 
(1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to overrule the "clear and present 
danger" test frequently used by the Supreme Court in freedom of speech cases up 
until that time). 
35 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,666 (1961) (Black, J., concurring) Uoining 
in the Court's overruling of a case in which he had concurred, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 
U.S. 25, 39 (1949) (Black, J., concurring) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and 
seizure)). 
36 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (overturning Colegrove v. Green, 
328 U.S. 549, 566 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
37 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overturning Betts v. Brady, 316 
U.S. 455, 474 (1942) (holding, over Justice Black's dissent, that state criminal defend-
ants did not have a federal constitutional right to counsel)). 
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Court, Justice Scalia has already called for the Court to overrule as erro-
neously reasoned precedents involving such varied subject matters as the 
Establishment Clause,38 separation of powers,39 the dormant Commerce 
Clause,40 nude dancing,41 obscenity,42 criminal procedure,43 substantive 
due process,44 the Takings Clause,45 and affirmative action.46 
38 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 
2141, 2150 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (declining to apply the test established in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and expressing his dismay at the Court's 
failure to acknowledge the need to abandon Lemon); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 
2649, 2685 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to overrule its "religion-
clause jurisprudence"). 
39 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (rejecting the Court's methodology in recent separation of powers decisions); 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 710-12 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same). 
40 See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 303-06 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (challenging the Court's dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence). 
41 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting, contrary to the Court's precedents, that nude dancing merits abso-
lutely no First Amendment protection). 
42 See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497,505 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling for a 
reconsideration of the Court's test for evaluating the constitutionality of obscenity 
laws, set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)). 
43 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2686 (1991) Goined only by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist in urging the overruling of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 
(1983)); California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1992 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(questioning United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), and Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132 (1925)); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 417 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(questioning Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966)); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656, (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part) (calling for the overruling of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)); South Caro-
lina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (urging the overruling 
of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)). 
44 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2873-74 (1992) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (calling for the overruling of 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 
490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (same). 
45 Cf Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting a standard for establishing a "taking" -as perhaps covering or including any 
governmental regulation driving someone out of business even though there might 
have been a legitimate state interest underlying the regulation-which is inconsistent 
with previous "takings" jurisprudence); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 
U.S. 825, 834 n.3 (1987) (arguing that Golblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), 
reflects "an assumption [as to the applicable standard for takings that] is inconsistent 
with the formulations of our later cases"). 
46 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-21 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (suggesting that race can never be the basis of legislative classifications, 
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Justices Black's and Scalia's persistent calls for overruling numerous 
precedents have often subjected them to the charge that they have squan-
dered their chances to build coalitions.47 However, they have both taken 
opportunities to vindicate themselves by joining majorities in overruling 
cases in which they originally dissented. For example, Justice Black had 
such chances in several areas,48 perhaps most notably in Gideon v. Wain-
wright,49 in which he voted with the majority to overrule Betts v. Brady,50 
a case in which he had dissented to the Court's holding that an indigent 
state criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel. 
Justice Scalia has already joined in overruling two decisions in which he 
had dissented to the Court's barring the admission of victim impact state-
ments in the sentencing phase of capital murder trials.51 
Justices Black's and Scalia's methodologies have also led them both, 
regardless of the substantive area involved, to favor bright line tests. 
They have supported such tests for restraining judicial abuse of discretion 
and for providing ample notice to legislatures of the limitations on their 
powers. Justice Scalia, for example, has explained that adhering to the 
plain meaning of the text necessitates judicial "establishment of broadly 
applicable general principles. "52 For Justice Scalia, establishing broad 
rules in adjudication has two benefits. First, it constrains judges by 
severely restricting their discretion as to which principle to apply in sub-
sequent cases.53 Second, this practice enables the courts to achieve pre-
dictability-an essential requirement of justice54-and actually enhances 
protection of individual rights by providing "a solid shield of a firm, clear 
thereby calling into question the validity of Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 
(1980)). 
47 See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 5, at 122-24 (arguing that Justice Scalia's wide-
spread challenges to precedent have marginalized his position on the Court); Kelman, 
supra note 29, at 251-52 (arguing that Justice Black may have squandered his influ-
ence on the Court because of his steadfast refusal to compromise his views). 
48 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
49 372 u.s. 335 (1963). 
50 316 u.s. 455 (1942). 
51 See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597,2609 (1991) Uoining in the Court's over-
rulings of South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 823 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting), 
and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 519 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
52 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 
1185 (1989). 
53 Justice Scalia explained that 
when ... I adopt a general rule, and say "This is the basis of our decision," I not 
only constrain lower courts, I constrain myself as well. If the next case should 
have such different facts that my political or policy preferences regarding the 
outcome are quite opposite, I will be unable to indulge those preferences; I have 
committed myself to the governing principle. 
Id. at 1179. 
54 ld. at 1179-80. 
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principle enunciated in earlier cases."55 Nevertheless, he recognizes that 
"when one does not have a solid textual anchor or an established social 
norm from which to derive the general rule, its pronouncement appears 
uncomfortably like legislation."56 
Justice Black undoubtedly would have agreed that bright line tests pro-
tect individual liberties. For him, the Constitution set forth principles 
that he characterized variously as "absolutes,"57 "safeguard[ s ],"58 "strictly 
defined boundaries,"59 and "limitations."60 He explained: "It is my belief 
that there are 'absolutes' in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put 
there on purpose by men who knew what words meant, and meant their 
prohibitions to be 'absolutes.' "61 He equated the notion of absolutes 
with bright line tests drawn or applied by the courts to prevent the dilu-
tion of individual liberties or the aggrandizement of any branch, including 
the judiciary, beyond its proper realm of authority.62 
Perhaps the most famous example of Justice Black's preference for 
bright line tests is his unique approach to the Freedom of Speech Clause 
of the First Amendment.63 He repeatedly argued that the First Amend-
ment meant exactly what it said in commanding that government could 
never abridge freedom of speech: "[T]he phrase 'Congress shall make no 
law' is composed of plain words, easily understood. . . . Neither as 
offered nor as adopted is the language of this amendment anything less 
that absolute."64 
55 /d. at 1180. 
56 /d. at 1185. 
57 Black, The Bill of Rights, supra note 16, at 867. 
58 ld. at 869. 
59 /d. at 871. 
60 /d. 
61 /d. at 867. 
62 See id. at 869-71. For Justice Black, this was the essential feature of a system of 
checks and balances "designed to prevent any branch ... from infringing individual 
liberties safeguarded by the Constitution." /d. at 870. 
63 The First Amendment provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no 
Jaw ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CoNST. amend. I. 
64 Black, The Bill of Rights, supra note 16, at 874, 879; see also BLACK, A CoNSTI-
TUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 6, at 45 ("As I have said innumerable times before I 
simply believe that 'Congress shall make no Jaw' means Congress shall make no 
Jaw."). Even though other justices consistently rejected his absolutist reading of the 
First Amendment during his 34 year tenure on the Court, Justice Black never wavered 
from it, as reflected even in his last opinion in New York Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (reiterating that, even when national 
security might be at stake, "the history and language of the First Amendment support 
the view that the press must be left to publish news, whatever the source, without 
censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints"). 
1994] A TALE OF TWO TEXTUALISTS 37 
Justice Scalia has reached a similarly absolutist reading of the Sixth 
Amendment's Confrontation Clause in his dissent in Maryland v. Craig.65 
There the Court ruled five-to-four that the government did not violate 
the Confrontation Clause in a child abuse action when it allowed a child 
witness to testify against a criminal defendant via one-way closed-circuit 
television. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor argued that the 
relevant history of the clause and precedent supported a balancing rather 
than an absolutist approach to the Sixth Amendment.66 In dissent, Jus-
tice Scalia argued that the Sixth Amendment permitted no such 
balancing: 
I have no need to defend the value of confrontation, because the 
Court has no authority to question it. . . . For good or bad, the Sixth 
Amendment requires confrontation, and we are not at liberty to 
ignore it. To quote the document one last time (for it plainly says all 
that need be said): "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him" 
. . . We are not free to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of clear and 
explicit constitutional guarantees, and then to adjust their meaning 
to comport with our findings.67 
Nor is there any doubt that Justice Black would have reached the same 
conclusion, because he construed "all of the[ ] requirements of the Sixth 
Amendment a[s] cast in terms both definite and absolute."68 
In short, Justices Black and Scalia have both rejected judicial balancing 
and opted instead in many instances for a similar judicial methodology: 
the formulation of bright line tests to apply in constitutional adjudication. 
The next part discusses the areas in which both Justices have arrived at 
similar substantive positions. 
II. JusTICEs BLACK's AND ScALIA's SuBSTANTIVE SIMILARITIES 
The similarities between Justices Black's and Scalia's approaches to the 
constitutional text become particularly apparent as one tracks their simi-
lar substantive positions. These similarities-often the result of applying 
similar bright line tests-appear in a wide variety of contexts, including 
but not limited to the Commerce Clause, substantive due process, equal 
65 497 u.s. 836 (1990). 
66 !d. at 847-50. 
67 !d. at 869-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original); see also id. at 862 
("Whatever else it may mean in addition, the defendant's constitutional right 'to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him' means, always and everywhere, at least 
what it explicitly says: the "'right to meet face to face all those who appear and give 
evidence at trial.""' (quoting his opinion in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) 
(quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)))). 
68 Black, The Bill of Rights, supra note 16, at 872. 
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protection, separation of powers, and even to a limited degree freedom of 
speech and search and seizure. Their respective decision making in these 
areas demonstrates the frequency with which Justice Black laid the partic-
ular doctrinal foundations that Justice Scalia would later develop. 
A. Commerce Clause 
The first major area of overlap between Justices Black and Scalia is the 
scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.69 Justice Black 
had strong views on the scope of permissible state and especially federal 
power under the Commerce Clause. As early as his second term in the 
United States Senate-in the midst of the Great Depression-Justice 
Black repeatedly argued that the Commerce Clause gave Congress the 
authority to pass appropriate legislation to deal with any problem that 
directly or indirectly affected the national economy and that the federal 
courts had no constitutional authority to interfere with such enact-
ments.70 Foreshadowing the positions he would later advocate on the 
Supreme Court, then-Senator Black also backed President Roosevelt's 
Court-packing plan in large part to ensure that the Court would be sym-
pathetic to a broad interpretation of Congress's power under the Com-
merce Clause.71 During his thirty-four year tenure on the Court, Justice 
Black never voted to strike down any federal law for violating the Com-
merce Clause. 
There is no question that Justice Scalia would agree with Justice 
Black's view of the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause. 
Justice Scalia has even admitted that had he been on the Court in the 
1930s, he would have sided with those justices, including Justice Black, 
who voted to uphold the constitutionality of progressive economic and 
social measures enacted by the Congress pursuant to its Commerce 
Clause power.72 Moreover, the two Justices would have at least agreed 
on the appropriate standard in dormant Commerce Clause cases. Justice 
Black, for instance, believed the states have the power to regulate even 
interstate commerce provided they did not discriminate against it and 
provided that Congress had not legislated against such regulation.73 Jus-
69 The Commerce Clause provides that "[t]he Congress shall have the power [t]o 
regulate Commerce with the foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
70 See, e.g, Michael J. Gerhardt, Justice Hugo L. Black, in THE JusTICES OF THE 
SuPREME CouRT OF THE UNITED STATES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY (Melvin I. 
Urofsky ed., forthcoming Sept. 1994); John P. Frank, Hugo L. Black, in 3 THE Jus-
TICES OF THE UNITED STATES SuPREME CouRT 1789-1969, at 2321-47 (Leon Fried-
man & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969). 
71 See SIMON, supra note 30, at 97. 
72 See Izenberg, supra note 18. 
73 See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,789-92,794 (1945) (Black, 
J., dissenting) (contending that states may pass laws impacting on interstate com-
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tice Black endorsed the "constitutional principle that states have power 
to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their inter-
nal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul 
of some specific federal constitutional prohibition."74 Similarly, Justice 
Scalia has agreed that, "[i]n the area of the negative Commerce Clause 
... a state cannot overtly discriminate against interstate commerce."75 
Justice Scalia prefers this rule to the Court's conventional balancing of 
federal and state interests in dormant Commerce Clause cases because 
the latter practice allows the Court to make policy determinations of a 
sort ordinarily left to the political process in state legislatures or in 
Congress. 76 
merce when Congress has not exercised its Commerce Clause power); Gwin, White & 
Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 452-54 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that absent federal action, states are entitled to enact laws affecting interstate com-
merce until Congress limits their authority by exercising its "paramount constitutional 
power"). 
74 Lincoln Fed. Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949) 
(citation omitted). 
75 Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 52, at 1185. 
76 See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). Although Justice Scalia voted in New York v. United 
States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), to strike down part of a federal law for violating the 
Commerce Clause or the Tenth Amendment because Congress had tried to "coerce" 
or "compel" the states to give up some of their "sovereignty," it is not clear that 
Justice Black would have voted any differently. First, despite his great deference to 
congressional enactments under the Commerce Clause, Justice Black never directly 
confronted the issue of whether or to what extent the federal government had the 
constitutional authority to regulate state activities, functions, or officials under the 
Commerce Clause. Second, he viewed the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as guaran-
teeing a realm of state autonomy by "limit[ing] the Federal Government to the pow-
ers granted expressly or by necessary implication." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 520 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Black twice opposed congres-
sional civil rights legislation that intruded too far into state sovereignty. See Oregon 
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 126 (1970) (Black, J. announcing the judgments of the 
Court) (taking the position that congressional legislation pursuant to section five of 
the Fourteenth Amendment establishing age qualifications for state and local elec-
tions was unconstitutional because those laws could potentially "blot out all state 
power, leaving the 50 states as little more than impotent figureheads"); South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 360 (1966) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing part) ("A federal law which assumes the power to compel the States to submit in 
advance any proposed legislation they have for approval by federal agents approaches 
dangerously near to wiping the States out as useful and effective units in the govern-
ment of our country."); see also Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 128 (observing that there were 
several limitations on Congress's powers to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments, 
including the framers' intent "not ... to strip the States of their power to govern 
themselves or to convert our national government of enumerated powers into a cen-
tral government of unrestrained authority over every inch of the whole Nation"). 
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B. Substantive Due Process 
Justices Black and Scalia have both opposed the Court's use of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment17 to protect substantive 
rights, especially those involving economic interests.78 For example, Jus-
tice Black viewed economic due process as a movement in which judges 
could strike down laws not because they violate the specific restrictions of 
the Constitution but because they are unreasonable, unfair, arbitrary, or 
capricious.79 Justice Blaclc opposed such open ended interpretation of 
the Due Process Clause because, in his view, it provided no limitation on 
judges' freedom to invoke their personal judgments in deciding constitu-
tional questions.80 
Justice Scalia has also supported the Court's rejection of substantive 
due process in the economic field.81 He has explained that his "skepti-
cism [about economic due process] arises from misgivings about, first, the 
effect of such expansion on the behavior of courts in other areas quite 
separate from economic liberty, and, second, the ability of the courts to 
limit their constitutionalizing to those elements of economic liberty that 
are sensible. "82 
Moreover, Justices Black and Scalia have not confined their distrust of 
substantive due process to the economic context. Both have also vigor-
ously opposed its use to protect noneconomic interests. Justice Black's 
opposition to substantive due process in noneconomic cases was most 
clearly evident in his dissent to the Court's recognition of a constitution-
ally protected right of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.83 He harshly 
criticized the majority for striking down a Connecticut law prohibiting the 
sale of contraceptives to married couples on the basis of an implied right 
77 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "[N]or shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
78 There is, however, one critical point regarding substantive due process on which 
they would have disagreed. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text. 
79 BLACK, A CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 6, at 28. 
80 !d. at 24. Justice Black wrote that expressions such as unreasonable, arbitrary, 
and capricious "impose no limitations or restrictions whatever on judges, but leave 
them completely free to decide constitutional questions on the basis of their own pol-
icy judgments." !d. 
81 Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, Address at the Cato Insti-
tute's Conference: Economic Liberties and the Judiciary (Oct. 26, 1984), reprinted in 
EcoNOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JuDICIARY 33-34 (James A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne 
eds., 1987) ("The Supreme Court decisions rejecting substantive due process in the 
economic field are clear, unequivocal and current ... [I]n my view the position the 
Supreme Court has arrived at is good .... "). 
82 !d. at 34. 
83 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting to the Court's recognition of a 
fundamental right of privacy protecting the use of contraception by married couples). 
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of privacy in the Constitution.84 For Justice Black, the framers of the Bill 
of Rights had already made a decision about which aspects of a person's 
privacy should be constitutionally protected and which aspects should be 
left to the majoritarian process for protection or regulation. He viewed 
the Court's recognition of implied fundamental rights, such as a general 
right of privacy, to be tantamount to the revival of economic due process 
in a noneconomic context. Thus, he argued that the "[u]se of any such 
broad, unbounded judicial authority would make of this Court's members 
a day-to-day constitutional convention."85 To him, a right of privacy was 
nothing more than a vague judge-made goal that "like a chameleon, has a 
different color for every turning."86 
Justice Scalia has shown a similar disdain for substantive due process in 
the noneconomic context. This contempt is reflected most clearly in his 
critiques of Roe v. Wade87 and subsequent decisions reaffirming the 
Court's recognition of a fundamental right to an abortion.88 For example, 
in his concurrence in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services ,89 Justice 
Scalia complained that 
[t]he outcome of today's case [narrowing Roe but not overruling 
it] will doubtless be heralded as a triumph of judicial statesmanship. 
It is not that, unless it is statesmanlike needlessly to prolong this 
Court's self-awarded sovereignty over a field where it has little 
proper business since the answers to most of the cruel questions 
posed are political and not juridical-a sovereignty which therefore 
quite properly, but to the great damage of the Court, makes it the 
object of the sort of organized public pressure that political institu-
tions in a democracy ought to receive.90 
84 /d. at 520. 
85 /d. 
86 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 77 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). 
87 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down a Texas Jaw criminalizing abortion as violat-
ing the right to privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
88 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). This case reaf-
firmed the central holding of Roe. /d. at 2821. However, the Court overruled in part 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,759, 
772 (1986), and City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 
420 (1983), both of which reaffirmed the central holding of Roe as inconsistent with 
the state's legitimate interest in protecting potential life. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816. 
89 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Justice Scalia wrote 
separately to voice his disappointment at the majority's failure to address directly the 
constitutional issue presented in this case. In his view, this was an appropriate case 
for the Court to dispose of the case on the constitutional issue. He favored treating 
the case as an exception to the general rule that requires the Court to decide cases on 
the narrowest ground possible. /d. at 534-35. 
90 /d. at 532. 
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More recently, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,91 Justice Scalia repeated 
his view that "the Constitution says absolutely nothing about [abortion), 
and ... the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it 
to be legally proscribed. "92 
C. Equal Protection 
Justices Black and Scalia have used similar bright line tests to strike 
down laws that explicitly discriminate on the basis of race as violating the 
Equal Protection Clause.93 In several cases,94 Justice Black voted to 
strike down laws that discriminated explicitly against individuals on the 
basis of their race. In Korematsu v. United States,95 he explained that any 
classification based on race was "suspect" and therefore must be sub-
jected to the "most rigid scrutiny" and upheld only if justified by a "pub-
lic necessity."96 Nevertheless, Justice Black found that the federal 
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II met that test. 
Justice Scalia has applied at least as tough a standard under the Equal 
Protection Clause to strike down any law that classifies people on the 
basis of race. In voting to strike down a city's set-aside of construction 
contracts for minority firms in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. ,97 he 
explained: 
At least where state or local action is at issue, only a social emer-
gency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb-for 
example, a prison race riot, requiring temporary segregation of 
inmates-can justify an exception to the principle embodied in the 
91 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2812-18 (1992) (reaffirming the essential holding of Roe but 
rejecting the trimester system in favor of the undue burden analysis). 
92 /d. at 2874 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For more on 
Justice Scalia's understanding of the role of "tradition" in constitutional adjudication, 
see infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text. 
93 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in perti-
nent part that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. 
94 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down a state law prevent-
ing marriages between persons solely on the basis of explicit racial classifications for 
violating the Equal Protection Clause); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
(striking down a state law explicitly mandating separation of the races in public school 
for violating the Equal Protection Clause). 
95 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality of federal internment of 
Japanese-Americans during World War II). 
96 /d. at 216. 
97 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring that "strict scrutiny must be 
applied to all governmental classification by race, whether or not its asserted purpose 
is 'remedial' or 'benign'"). 
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Fourteenth Amendment that "[ o ]ur Constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."98 
Moreover, outside the context of racial discrimination, Justice Black 
vigorously opposed judicial enforcement of so-called equal protection 
fundamental rights, which were interests found by the Warren Court to 
be of such importance that distinctions made on the basis of their exercise 
required compelling justifications. He maintained that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause had been designed primarily to end racial discrimination and 
insisted that the Warren Court should apply a rational basis test to review 
equal protection claims. Hence, he dissented to the Warren Court's uses 
of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to strike down laws 
that made it more difficult for people to engage in interstate travel99 or to 
vote.100 
Justice Scalia has thus far not encountered any asserted claims of equal 
protection fundamental interests. However, there are two reasons to 
believe his position with respect to these interests would be the same as 
Justice Black's. First, equal protection fundamental rights typically 
resemble affirmative rights in that they both require the government to 
expend resources. Justice Scalia has endorsed the view that the Constitu-
tion protects only negative rights, which require the government to 
refrain from doing certain things. 101 Second, Justice Scalia's critique of 
98 /d. at 521 (citation omitted). Justice Scalia endorsed a standard at least as tough 
as strict scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), in which he 
joined Justice Kennedy's dissent to the majority's decision to uphold a congressional 
program establishing explicitly race-based preferences for awarding broadcast 
licenses. /d. at 631 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy denounced the Court's 
abandonment of strict scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of explicitly race-
based preferences and cautioned that "[e]ven strict scrutiny may not have sufficed to 
invalidate early race based laws of most doubtful validity, as we learned in [Kore-
matsu.]"). !d. at 633. 
99 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 648 (1969) (Warren, C.J., joined by Black, 
J., dissenting on the ground that the right to travel cannot be the basis for invalidating 
residency requirements for voting because Congress has the authority to burden 
travel interests). 
100 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621,634 (1969) (Stewart, J., 
joined by Black, J., dissenting to the Court's holding that a New York law requiring 
ownership or leasing of taxable property for eligibility to vote in school board elec-
tions violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Harper v. 
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting to the 
Court's holding that Virginia's poll tax violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
101 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
195-96 (1989) (holding that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments impose no affirmative duties on government). See generally Michael J. 
Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights 
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substantive due process102 is consistent with Justice Black's rejection of 
substantive due process and equal protection fundamental rights as disin-
genuous judicial efforts to substitute personal preferences for the actual 
constitutional text. Justice Black wrote: 
There is no constitutional support whatever for this Court to use the 
Due Process Clause as though it provided a blank check to alter the 
meaning of the Constitution as written so as to add to it substantive 
constitutional changes which a majority of the Court at any given 
time believes are needed to meet present-day problems. Nor is there 
in my opinion any more constitutional support for this Court to use 
the Equal Protection Clause ... to write into the Constitution its 
notions of what it thinks is good governmental policy.103 
D. Separation of Powers 
In the area of separation of powers Justices Black and Scalia have both 
endorsed a formalist methodology. This approach is "premised on the 
beliefs that the text of the Constitution and the intent of its drafters are 
controlling and sometimes dispositive, that changed circumstances are 
irrelevant to constitutional outcomes, and that broader 'policy' concerns 
should not play a role in legal decisions."104 In Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer/05 Justice Black's only major separation of powers opinion, 
he took a purely formalist position by voting to strike down President 
Truman's seizure of the nation's steel mills. According to Justice Black, 
the power to seize the steel mills was exclusively within Congress's 
authority while the President's only explicit constitutional authority was 
"to see that the laws are faithfully executed."106 The Constitution grants 
Congress the exclusive authority to "make laws necessary and proper to 
carry out the powers vested by the Constitution."107 Because the Presi-
dent's seizure of the steel mills was an exercise of power explicitly dele-
gated to another branch, he violated the separation of powers demanded 
by the Constitution.108 
Vision of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REv. 409, 410 (1990) (distinguishing between 
"affirmative" and "negative" rights). 
102 See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
103 Harper, 383 U.S. at 675-76 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should 
follow the original meaning of the Constitution). 
104 Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 
421, 495 (1987). 
105 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding that an executive order seizing a number of the 
nation's steel mills was unconstitutional). 
106 !d. at 587. 
107 !d. at 588-89. 
108 !d. 
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Justice Scalia has expanded on Justice Black's formalism. For example, 
in Morrison v. Olson,109 Justice Scalia dissented on the ground that the 
Ethics in Government Act's110 vesting of executive prosecutorial power 
in an individual not removable at will by the President violated the con-
cept that "all purely executive power must be under control of the Presi-
dent."111 Justice Scalia further opined that the majority's "ad hoc 
approach to constitutional adjudication" undermined the immutable allo-
cation of powers set forth in the Constitution.112 
Similarly, in Mistretta v. United States,113 Justice Scalia dissented on 
separation of powers grounds from the majority's opinion, which upheld 
the constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Commission, at least 
three of whose members are required by statute to be federal judges, and 
which is empowered to promulgate, review, and revise sentence-determi-
native guidelines. For Justice Scalia, the Commission's fatal flaw was that 
"[its] only governmental power ... is the power to make law; and it is not 
the Congress."114 
E. Other Constitutional Areas 
In at least two other areas, Justices Black and Scalia have specifically 
urged the Court to reject judicial balancing in favor of bright line tests. 
First, in freedom of speech cases, they have both applied rigorous bright 
line tests to protect freedom of speech from governmental censorship or 
punishment. This Article has already alluded to Justice Black's absolutist 
reading of the Freedom of Speech Clause, 115 which led him to oppose any 
prior restraint of the press116 or any regulation of verbal or written com-
munications or expressions, including but not limited to advocating the 
overthrow of government, 117 obscene materials, 118 and any libel or defa-
109 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of the independent 
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978). 
110 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-99 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
111 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 709 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
112 /d. at 734. 
113 488 u.s. 361, 413 (1989). 
114 /d. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
115 BLACK, A CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 6, at 45-47; see supra notes 63-
64 and accompanying text. 
116 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
117 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36,77-80 (1961) (Black, J., dissent-
ing from the Court's holding that the Supreme Court of California's refusal to admit 
the petitioner to the state bar because of his refusal to answer questions pertaining to 
his membership in the communist party did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 145-46 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting to the 
Court's upholding the conviction of an individual who refused to tell the House On-
American Activities Committee whether he was or ever had been a communist); Den-
nis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579-80 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting from the Court's 
affirming of petitioner's conviction of conspiracy to organize a communist party). 
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mation laws.119 Justice Scalia in turn has treated as content-based and 
therefore presumptively invalid any law regulating arguably political 
discourse.120 
Moreover, like Justice Black, Justice Scalia opposes judicial balanc-
ing.121 In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,122 for example, he 
dissented to the majority's opinion that upheld the state of Michigan's 
efforts to regulate the speech of corporations to ensure a more level play-
ing field in public discussions. He was particularly opposed to the major-
ity's balancing of the value of individual freedom of expression on 
political subjects against the right of corporations to use their wealth to 
influence political debate: 
This is not an argument that our democratic traditions allow-
neither with respect to individuals associated in corporations nor 
with respect to other categories of individuals whose speech may be 
"unduly" extensive (because they are rich) or "unduly" persuasive 
(because they are movie stars) or "unduly" respected (because they 
are clergymen). The premise of our system is that there is no such 
thing as too much speech-that the people are not foolish but intelli-
gent, and will separate the wheat from the chaff.123 
Indeed, in any case involving the Bill of Rights, "[t]he premise ... is that 
there are some things-even some seemingly desirable things-that gov-
ernment cannot be trusted to do. The very first of these is establishing 
the restrictions upon speech that will assure 'fair' political debate."124 
us BLACK, A CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 6, at 46-47 (stating his position 
against censorship of "obscene" materials). 
ll9 Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Inter-
view, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 557-58 (1962) (interviewing Justice Black, who stated: 
"(T]here should be no libel or defamation law in the United States."); see BLACK, A 
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 6, at 48. 
120 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) (stating that 
"(c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid"). Justice Scalia also joined 
two other decisions in which the Court struck down laws prohibiting flag-burning as 
content-based and, therefore, automatically violative of the First Amendment. 
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
In contrast, Justice Black excluded symbolic conduct from the protections of the Free-
dom of Speech Clause. See BLACK, A CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 6, at 56-
58. 
121 See supra part LB. 
122 494 U.S 652 (1990) (upholding a Michigan statute that regulated corporate 
spending on state political campaigns). 
123 Id. at 695 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
124 Id. at 692. 
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Another area of overlap for both Justices Black and Scalia is the 
Fourth Amendment.125 Both justices have argued that the Fourth 
Amendment embodies categorical rules even though it permits judges to 
engage in what seems like balancing in the process of determining the 
unreasonableness of governmental searches and seizures. As Justice 
Black explained: 
The use of the word "unreasonable" in this Amendment means, of 
course, that not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Only those 
which are unreasonable are unlawful. There may be much difference 
of opinion about whether a particular search or seizure is unreasona-
ble and therefore forbidden by this Amendment. But if it is unrea-
sonable, it is absolutely prohibited. Likewise, the provision which 
forbids warrants for arrest, search or seizure without 'probable 
cause' is itself and absolute prohibition.126 
Similarly, Justice Scalia has taken what he regards as a categorical 
approach in defining a search and a seizure.127 For example, he rejected 
the Court's totality of the circumstances test for determining whether the 
government has made a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
As he explained, "police conduct cannot constitute a 'seizure' until (as 
that word connotes) it has had a restraining effect."128 Further, in deter-
mining what constitutes a home for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, 
he explained: "If a barn was not considered curtilage of a house in 1791 
or 1868 and the Fourth Amendment did not cover it then, unlawful entry 
125 The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. 
126 Black, The Bill of Rights, supra note 16, at 873. Another example of Justice 
Black's literalist approach is his position that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit 
unauthorized governmental wiretapping. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 
(1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("A conversation overheard by eavesdropping, whether 
by plain snooping or wiretapping ... can neither be searched nor seized."). Else-
where he explained: 
I just cannot say that a conversation may be "searched" or "seized" within the 
ordinary and generally accepted meanings of those words. When this is rein-
forced by the historical evidence that the Framers were aware of the practice of 
eavesdropping, ... I cannot help but believe that if they had desired to outlaw or 
restrict the use of evidence obtained by such a practice, they would have used the 
appropriate language in the Fourth Amendment to do so. 
BLACK, A CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 6, at 10. 
127 Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 52, at 1184 (stating that adherence to a 
"more or less originalist theory of construction" facilitates the "formulation of general 
rules"). 
128 ld. Justice Scalia later incorporated this view into his majority opinion for the 
Court in California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621 (1991), in which the Court ruled that a 
suspect is not "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment unless that person is 
physically grabbed by or formally surrenders to the government. 
48 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:25 
into a barn today may be a trespass, but not an unconstitutional search 
and seizure."129 
In Arizona v. Hicks, 130 in determining whether a search has occurred, 
Justice Scalia rejected balancing the interests of law enforcement against 
the interest in privacy. He found that the probable cause requirement 
applied throughout a warrantless search of an apartment, such that the 
exception for any item in plain view did not even permit an officer's tem-
porarily lifting a turntable.131 He suggested that, unless an item was in 
plain view, it could not be searched without a warrant or probable cause 
because "a search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but 
the bottom of a turntable."132 
In the First and Fourth Amendment contexts, it nevertheless becomes 
apparent that, in spite of their similar methodologies, Justices Black and 
Scalia have not reached the same substantive positions in all areas. It is 
worth exploring their most significant differences because these differ-
ences reveal even more about the textualism of each Justice. 
III. JusTicEs BLACK's AND ScALIA's CRITICAL DIVERGENCES 
The most notable differences between Justices Black and Scalia are 
revealed in two areas: freedom of religion and the relevance or signifi-
cance of tradition as a source of meaning in constitutional interpretation. 
These differences illustrate the relationship between each Justice's atti-
tude toward the propriety of judicial activism or restraint in general and 
his approach to the specific constitutional provision involved. 
A. Freedom of Religion 
Justices Black and Scalia would have clearly been at odds in most reli-
gion cases. Running throughout their disagreement in this area is Justice 
Black's conviction that the text and original meaning clearly authorize 
judicial intervention and Justice Scalia's conflicting concern about judicial 
129 Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 52, at 1184 (discussing the formulation of 
general rules in the area of search and seizure). 
130 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (holding that a police officer's lifting of a turntable to view 
serial numbers constituted a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
131 /d. at 326-28. 
132 ld. at 325. Despite his frequent criticisms of the Court's penchant for judicial 
balancing in Fourth Amendment cases, Justice Scalia has written or joined in opinions 
in which the Court has actually balanced competing interests in search and seizure 
cases. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (finding that the government's 
flying of a helicopter over a private greenhouse was not a "search" for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (finding that the 
government's sifting through a person's garbage was not a "search" for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (treating a war-
rantless search of a probationer's home differently for Fourth Amendment purposes 
from that of any other private citizen). 
1994] A TALE OF TWO TEXTUALISTS 49 
overinvolvement and the need for greater judicial deference to 
majoritarian preferences. In other words, Justice Black was willing in 
religion cases to enforce his absolutist reading of the text, even though it 
often led to judicial activism, while Justice Scalia's goal in this area has 
been to secure judicial restraint, despite arguably conflicting constitu-
tional text or original meaning. 
For example, in Everson v. Board of Education,133 Justice Black wrote 
the Court's first opinion ever to apply the Establishment Clause134 to the 
states. Although the Everson Court ultimately concluded that the state's 
payment of bus fares for all pupils, including those in parochial schools, 
served a secular purpose, and therefore did not violate the Establishment 
Clause, Justice Black understood the original intent underlying that pro-
vision to erect "'a wall of separation between Church and State' "135 and 
noted that government cannot "contribute tax-raised funds to the support 
of an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any church."136 Jus-
tice Black also authored Engel v. Vitale, 137 which held that a state-spon-
sored "non-denominational prayer"138 was "wholly inconsistent" with the 
Establishment Clause.139 He viewed the founders' understanding of the 
Establishment Clause as prohibiting any laws that "establish an official · 
religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving indi-
viduals or not."140 Justice Black explained that the history of the Estab-
lishment Clause demonstrated that it stood "as an expression of principle 
on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too per-
sonal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil 
magistrate."141 He also concurred in Lemon v. Kurtzman/42 in which the 
Burger Court set forth a three-part test for evaluating whether a statute 
violated the Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; ... finally, the statute must 
not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "143 
133 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that state funding of students' transportation to 
parochial schools does not violate the Establishment Clause). 
134 The First Amendment provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. 
135 330 U.S; at 16 (citation omitted). 
136 /d. 
137 370 u.s. 421 (1962). 
138 /d. at 430 (stating that "[n]either the fact that the prayer may be denomination-
ally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can 
serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause"). 
139 /d. at 424. 
140 /d. at 430. 
141 /d. at 432. 
142 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring, joined by Black, J.). 
143 /d. at 612-13 (citations omitted). 
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Thus, Justice Black read the Establishment Clause to require strict sepa-
ration of church and state. 
In contrast, Justice Scalia to date has not voted to strike down any law 
for violating the Establishment Clause. He has grounded his decisions in 
this area in neither the text nor in the original meaning of the Establish-
ment Clause. Rather, in his dissent in Lee v. Weisman, 144 in which the 
Supreme Court held that a nonsectarian prayer at a public school gradua-
tion violated the Establishment Clause, he challenged the Lemon test for 
ignoring "the historic practices of our people"145 and for relying on intru-
sive judicial inquiries into the unreliable and easily manipulated legisla-
tive histories of the majoritarian enactments at issue.146 Thus, Justice 
Scalia concluded in Weisman that public school prayer does not violate 
the Establishment Clause, because it derives from "long-accepted consti-
tutional traditions. "147 
The two Justices also have reached remarkably different readings of 
the Free Exercise Clause. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, 148 Justice 
Black joined the Court's endorsement of a test that evaluates free exer-
cise claims in terms of whether the statute involved substantially burdens 
the claimant's religious beliefs or practices and, if so, whether it is justi-
fied by a compelling government interest. In contrast, in both Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah 149 and Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, 150 Justice Scalia rejected the application of the Sherbert test 
in free exercise cases in favor of the position that "a neutral, generally 
applicable law" does not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if it inter-
fered with the practices of some religions. In Smith, Justice Scalia ironi-
cally echoed Justice Black's understanding of the Free Exercise Clause as 
drawing "the line ... between freedom to believe in and advocate a doc-
trine and freedom to engage in conduct violative of the law."151 In 
144 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2679 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
145 !d. 
146 See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist. 113 S. Ct. 2141, 
2159 (1993) (Scalia, J. concurring) (arguing that Lemon should already be "dead" as a 
precedent); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 
2217, 2239 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (arguing that it is "virtually impossi-
ble to determine the singular 'motive' of a collective legislative body ... and this 
Court has a long tradition of refraining from such inquiries" (citations omitted)); 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the Lemon "purpose" test for relying on unreliable, easily manipulated inquiries into 
legislative history). 
147 112 S. Ct. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
148 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a provision of the South Carolina Unemploy-
ment Act that denies compensation to a Seventh Day Adventist who was discharged 
for refusing to work on the sabbath violates the Establishment Clause). 
149 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2239 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
150 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
15 1 BLACK, A CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 6, at 56. 
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upholding a law that criminalized peyote use even in religious rituals, Jus-
tice Scalia explained that his approach derived from the need to avoid 
intrusive judicial inquiry into particular religious beliefs or practices.152 
To justify this approach, he has relied neither on the constitutional text 
nor on its original meaning. Rather, he has relied on precedentl53 and on 
his assertion that "the negative protection accorded to religious belief can 
be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well."154 
B. The Role of Tradition in Constitutional Analysis 
A second area of sharp disagreement between Justices Black and Scalia 
involves their different attitudes toward tradition as a possible source of 
constitutional meaning. Justice Scalia has invoked "tradition"-or "long-
standing" majoritarian practices-to illuminate the scope or content of 
particular constitutional guarantees, particularly those that are open-
ended or ambiguous. For example, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 155 the 
Court rejected a challenge to a state law presumption of paternity of a 
child born to a married woman living with her husband. Justice Scalia 
explained: 
We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition pro-
tecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified. 
If, for example, there was no societal tradition, either way, regarding 
the rights of the natural father of a child adulterously conceived, we 
would have to consult, and ... reason from, the traditions regarding 
natural fathers in general. But there is a more specific tradition, and 
it unqualifiedly denies protection to such a parent. 156 
According to Justice Scalia, the Court's general duties involve "reading 
text and discerning our society's traditional understanding of that 
text."157 He believes the Court should respect longstanding majoritarian 
practices as an accurate measure of the Constitution's meaning. In this 
manner, tradition properly understood takes on the status of stare decisis 
for purposes of predictability, continuity, and stability in governmental 
decision making.158 This explains why Justice Scalia has chastised the 
Court for failing to recognize longstanding traditions favoring state regu-
lations of abortion and has consequently rejected a Fourteenth Amend-
152 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87. 
153 See Church of the Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2239 (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining 
that his position in Smith primarily rested on precedent and that the terms "neutral-
ity" and "general applicability" do not appear in the First Amendment, but are used 
in Smith and earlier cases). 
15 4 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
155 491 u.s. 110 (1989). 
156 !d. at 127-28 n.6. 
157 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2884 (1992) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
158 See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
52 BOSTON UNWERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:25 
ment due process right of women to have unlimited access to abortion.159 
It also explains his position in Lee v. Weisman that invocations and bene-
dictions at public school graduation exercises are supported by longstand-
ing tradition and therefore are not forbidden by the Establishment 
Clause.160 
Justice Black would have rejected Justice Scalia's reliance on tradition. 
First, Justice Black would have argued that neither the Constitution nor 
its original meaning authorize judicial reliance on nontextual sources of 
decision such as tradition.161 For Justice Black, history could not add a 
gloss to the constitutional text: A rights-granting provision, for example, 
says what it says and nothing more or less until and unless it is 
amended.162 
Second, Justice Black probably would have argued that Justice Scalia's 
reliance on tradition exposes Justice Scalia's personal preferences, partic-
ularly in light of Justice Scalia's use of tradition to defeat individual rights 
claims even when the relevant text or its original meaning directs other-
wise.163 Mindful that deviations from the constitutional text are just as 
likely to result in the contraction as in the expansion of individual liber-
ties, 164 Justice Black would have viewed Justice Scalia as using tradition 
as a non textual source of decision to defeat judicial intervention. For Jus-
tice Black, only the constitutional text may authorize judicial intervention 
or deference. He believed that majorities may continue to do what they 
have long done if and only if they are permitted to do so by virtue of the 
159 See, e.g, Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874. 
160 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2680 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
161 The following quote from Justice Scalia typifies the particular view with which 
Justice Black would have vehemently disagreed: "'"I adhere to the text where the 
text is clear. Where the text leaves room for interpretation, I am guided in what it 
means by our societal traditions, not by a show of hands.""' Kannar, supra note 19, 
at 1319 n.113 (quoting Dixon, BC Press Grills Scalia, THE KINGSMAN (Brooklyn Col-
lege student newspaper), Oct. 23, 1985, at 5 (quoting Justice Scalia)). Justice Black 
would have countered that, in those situations in which the text is unclear, one should 
consult the history of the Constitution and not the history of its interpretation by 
society or even the Court. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
162 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
163 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1512 (1990) (arguing that, contrary to 
Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith, "the modern doctrine of free exercise exemptions is 
more consistent with the original understanding than is a position that leads only to 
the facial neutrality of legislation"); see also infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
164 See BLACK, A CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH supra note 6, at 12-14; Black, The Bill 
of Rights, supra note 16, at 878 (arguing that constitutional balancing allows the Court 
to be swayed by the government in times of crisis to curtail individual liberties); cf 
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, supra note 10, at 855-56 (arguing that a 
nonoriginalist reading of the constitutional text can lead to expansion or contraction 
of individual liberties). 
1994] A TALE OF TWO TEXTUALISTS 53 
Constitution's silence on the matter in question. Indeed, Justice Scalia 
concedes as much by denying any constitutional protection to longstand-
ing traditions that violate a clear textual mandate. 165 This concession 
would have admitted the obvious to Justice Black: A tradition does not 
receive constitutional protection because it is old or even because people 
have long relied on its perpetuation, but rather because it does not con-
flict with an explicit guarantee. Justice Black would have argued that 
using historical convention rather than the constitutional text or its origi-
nal meaning to uphold a majoritarian practice is a thinly veiled effort to 
ignore the text and its original meaning. Justice Scalia arguably did this 
in Smith for the sake of preserving the status quo and the longstanding 
majoritarian practices he preferred.166 
Moreover, Justice Black might have argued that, as long as Justice 
Scalia claims a tradition may be upheld because it does not violate a clear 
textual mandate to the contrary,167 then he has failed to provide the kind 
of bright line test he prefers to avoid abuses of judicial discretion. Also, it 
is far from clear how long or how many states must do something in order 
for their practices to become a tradition of constitutional significance for 
Justice Scalia. 
In contrast to Justice Scalia's willingness to rely on tradition to supple-
ment the constitutional text and even to recognize the merit of some sub-
stantive due process claims, 168 Justice Black sought to restrict judicial 
165 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2874 n.1 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the Court's striking down a 
state law prohibiting interracial marriages in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967), 
in spite of longstanding majoritarian practices to the contrary, on the ground that 
"[a)ny tradition in that case was contradicted by a text-an Equal Protection Clause 
that explicitly establishes racial equality as a constitutional value"). 
166 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see supra note 163 and infra note 204 and accompanying 
text. 
167 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
168 Justice Scalia joined opinions recognizing prisoners' fundamental or substantive 
due process rights to marry in Thrner v. Safly, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), and to be free from 
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210 (1990). Justice Black undoubtedly would have found that the government's con-
cerns in both cases were immaterial because the relevant text is silent and thus leaves 
nonreviewable discretion in prison authorities to do whatever they want to do with 
respect to the personal interests involved. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 508-21 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing each of the bases on which 
the majority applied the Fourteenth Amendment beyond its historical and textual 
meanings) with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Black, J., joining the Court's 
decision striking down a law prohibiting interracial marriages for violating the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535 (1942) (Black, J.,joining the Court's unanimous decision striking down a state law 
mandating sterilization for certain repeat felons for violating the. Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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interference with majoritarian decisions to cases only involving individual 
liberties explicitly protected by the constitutional text. Even when faced 
with the open-ended term "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause, Justice Black explained that his study of the history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment persuaded him "that one of the chief objects 
that the provisions of the Amendment's first section, separately, and as a 
whole, were intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights appli-
cable to the States."169 He especially feared 
the consequences of the Court's practice of substituting its own con-
cept of decency and fundamental justice for the language of the Bill 
of Rights as its point of departure in interpreting and enforcing that 
Bill of Rights . . . . To hold that this Court can determine what, if 
any, provisions of the Bill of Rights will be enforced, and if so to 
what degree, is to frustrate the great design of a written 
Constitution.170 
In other words, Justice Black sought to restrict judicial discretion by urg-
ing the Court to define the term liberty by reference to other language in 
the Constitution in which the original framers had defined the basic com-
ponents of liberty as consisting of the specific guarantees set forth in the 
first eight Amendments. 
It is significant that the two Justices' different positions on freedom of 
religion and tradition are influenced by their different opinions about 
how to secure judicial restraint or how to avoid judicial activism.171 As 
169 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
170 /d. at 89. 
171 The differences between Justices Black's and Scalia's approaches to statutory 
interpretation are subtler and perhaps less revealing. On the one hand, Justice Scalia 
has urged the Court to abandon its traditional use of legislative history to interpret 
statutes except in the rare case in which the statutory text is absurd on its face. Green 
v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co. 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). In 
place of the conventional approach, he has argued that the only legitimate source for 
interpretive guidance in statutory cases is the text of the statute at issue, or related 
provisions of enacted law that shed light on the meaning of the disputed text. See 
Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 62 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738-39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia has justified 
his approach on the ground that judges can easily manipulate legislative history. 
Staffers rather than members of Congress create legislative history, and legislators 
support or oppose bills for reasons that are often unclear. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 
489 U.S. 87, 98-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
Perhaps most importantly, Justice Scalia has suggested that the Court should never 
deviate from the statutory text, which is all that Congress has formally enacted into 
law. Any attempt by judges to read anything else into a formal enactment is an 
improper exercise of unique legislative authority, while any effort by Congress to con-
trol the interpretation of statutes after their enactment is an invalid usurpation of 
duties left by the Constitution exclusively with the courts. See Thompson v. Thomp-
son, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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the next part demonstrates more fully, such different attitudes depend to 
a significant degree on neither the constitutional text nor on its original 
meaning, but rather on the respective Justices' personal and political 
judgments about the role of the federal judiciary in American society. 
IV. THE LIMITS oF JusTicEs BLACK's AND ScALIA's TEXTUALISM 
Justices Black's and Scalia's professed fidelity to textualism does not 
fully explain their respective constitutional decisions. Rather, their 
approaches to constitutional interpretation have turned primarily on their 
personal and political judgments regarding the role of the federal judici-
ary in American society, which have reflected changing attitudes toward 
judicial restraint and activism. 
For example, New Deal liberals, like Justice Black, equated improper 
judicial activism with the economic due process decisions of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, striking down desperately needed 
economic reforms.172 They trusted the fairness and workability of the 
majoritarian process, at least with respect to economic and social reforms, 
and they correspondingly distrusted the judiciary in cases involving eco-
nomic matters. 
The New Deal liberals on the Court could not agree, however, on what 
approach to substitute for economic due process (other than a very defer-
ential reading of the Due Process Clause in cases involving economic 
interests) and how to interpret noneconomic liberty claims, particularly 
On the other hand, Justice Black's approach to statutory construction is more 
ambiguous. He never set forth an elaborate theory or general position on statutory 
interpretation. Instead, he took the approach that he thought the particular case 
demanded. In some cases, he construed the statute at issue strictly on the basis of the 
plain language or meaning of the text. See United States v. Sullivan, 322 U.S. 689, 693 
(1948) (stating that when a restrictive interpretation is not required by the text of the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, the Court should not apply a restrictive interpretation 
simply because Congress has departed from custom). He also agreed that only Con-
gress had the constitutional authority to make law and that another branch's attempt 
to do so violated the principle of separation of powers. Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Yet, he joined or authored opinions relying on the 
extensive use of legislative history. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 367 U.S. 167 (1961) 
Uoining Justice Douglas's opinion, which relied on legislative history to clarify the 
meaning of the word "person" in 42 U.S.C. § 1983); ICC v. Inland Waterways Corp., 
319 U.S. 671, 692 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) (demonstrating that the majority's 
upholding of a tariff issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission was not sup-
ported by an extensive review of the legislative history of the Transportation Act of 
1940). 
172 See generally DuNNE, supra note 1, at 163-65 (discussing then-Senator Black's 
criticism of Supreme Court decisions that invalidated New Deal legislation and his 
call for radical legislative change of the Court's jurisdiction); FRANK, supra note 1, at 
63-94 (describing then-Senator Black's support for New Deal Legislation and his sen-
atorial investigations of big business interests); SIMON, supra note 30, at 88-97 (same). 
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those based on specific constitutional provisions.173 For example, Justice 
Frankfurter proposed extreme judicial deference to legislative judgment 
across the board.174 In contrast, Justice Black favored constitutional liter-
alism and formalism as a way of eliminating judicial activism in economic 
due process cases. But, he also advocated bold judicial enforcement of 
the Constitution's explicit guarantees. Justice Black's textualism repre-
sented his effort to limit judicial discretion and to justify judicial flexibil-
ity to enforce and interpret the constitutional text, including its broad 
language.175 
Consequently, for Justice Black, judicial restraint was not always a vir-
tue. It was appropriate in those significant instances in which the Consti-
tution was silent with respect to an important personal interest. It was 
especially inappropriate, though, in cases involving violations of explicit 
constitutional guarantees.176 In the latter context, the Court's principal 
duty as a countermajoritarian institution was to enforce the text, regard-
less of the consequences. As Justice Black explained, "the judiciary was 
made independent because it has ... the primary responsibility and duty 
of giving force and effect to constitutional liberties and limitations upon 
the executive and legislative branches."177 In all other cases, the Court 
should defer to the judgments of the democratic institutions of govern-
ment.178 Thus, another critical element of Justice Black's liberalism was 
his commitment to the Court's rigid enforcement of the Constitution's 
explicit guarantees to the fullest extent possible-i.e., absolutely-to pro-
tect the American people from certain "ancient evils."179 
Justice Black's views on judicial activism and restraint, however, were 
not shaped in the abstract. They were clearly influenced by his personal 
and professional experiences.18° For example, as a police court judge and 
173 See GERHARDT & RowE, supra note 4, at 213; see also Melvin I. Urofsky, Con-
flict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas and the Clash of Per-
sonalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, 1988 DuKE L.J. 7, 81-
83 (contrasting the philosophies of Justices Frankfurter and Douglas with respect to 
judicial activism and restraint). 
174 See SIMON, supra note 30, at 62-63, 121, 128 (describing Justices Black's and 
Frankfurter's differences of opinion on how much deference the Court should afford 
majoritarian decision making). 
175 See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JuDICIAL TRADITION: 
PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 333-36 (1988) (discussing Justice Black's 
attempts to deal with modern technological and social developments that threatened 
the values he sought to protect). 
176 See BLACK, A CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 6, at 14-15. 
177 Black, The Bill of Rights, supra note 16, at 870. 
178 /d. 
179 /d. at 867, 874-81. 
180 See generally DuNNE, supra note 1, 85-173 (detailing Justice Black's pre-Court 
life); SILVERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 90-125 (same); SIMON, supra note 30, at 66-100, 
209-11 (same); see also Mark V. Thshnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and 
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county prosecutor, he had learned about police misconduct and about the 
need for efficient and equal justice.181 These personal experiences helped 
to motivate him later as a senator to declare that he would not vote to 
confirm a prosecutor as a federal judge if the prosecutor had abused fair 
criminal procedures, 182 and as a Supreme Court justice to lead the Court 
to enforce strictly the Constitution's provisions requiring trial by juryl83 
and availability of counsel184 and prohibiting coerced confessions/85 com-
pulsory self-incrimination, 186 and double jeopardy.187 
Ironically, Justice Scalia came from a conservative movement that 
developed in the 1960s and grew in the 1970s in opposition to what it 
perceived as rampant judicial activism in the twentieth century. The con-
servative movement of this period opposed the Warren Court's extension 
of federal judicial power beyond the economic context, particularly at the 
expense of the states, through the doctrines of incorporation, equal pro-
tection fundamental rights, separation of church and state, and substan-
Experience, 72 B.U. L. REv. 747 (1992) (discussing the relevance of the character and 
political and personal experiences of particular Supreme Court justices, including Jus-
tice Black, to their judicial decision making). 
181 See Frank, supra note 70, at 2324, 2338-39 (describing then-Judge Black's effi-
cient operation of his Birmingham, Alabama courtroom, his success as a prosecutor, 
and his early opposition to the use of coerced confessions); see also SIMON, supra note 
30, at 72-76 (relating several anecdotes from Justice Black's days as a municipal court 
judge and a county prosecutor). 
182 Frank, supra note 70, at 2330. 
183 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162-71 (1968) (Black, J., concur-
ring) (enunciating his theory of incorporation); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 
213 (1967) (enunciating the right to a speedy trial); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) 
(holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires both 
public trial and prior notice of charges). 
184 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (specifically incorporating 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (holding the right to counsel so funda-
mental as to require intelligent and competent waiver). 
185 See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (finding no meaningful distinction 
for constitutional purposes between a confession obtained through torture and one 
obtained through psychological pressure). 
186 See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (overruling Adamson v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 46 (1947)). 
187 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (making the Double Jeopardy 
Clause applicable to the states). Moreover, it is well documented that Justice Black's 
ill health and impatience with the excesses of political protest and experimentation in 
the 1960s led him during his last decade on the Court to write shorter, angrier opin-
ions, and to show less tolerance for dissenting or anti-establishment speech than he 
had demonstrated during his previous 24 years on the Court. See generally Roger K. 
Newman, Hugo L. Black, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION 121, 
122 (Leonard Levy et al. eds., 1986). 
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tive due process.188 These conservatives later denounced the Burger 
Court for balancing competing interests in a variety of constitutional 
contexts.189 
Yet, this movement ultimately divided over whether to reject judicial 
balancing altogether and over just how far the Court should go in enforc-
ing explicit constitutional guarantees.19° For example, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist has responded to the Court's activism in the twentieth century 
by deferring to majoritarian judgments even more extensively than Jus-
tice Frankfurter.191 Similarly, Justice Scalia has unequivocally distanced 
himself from the label of judicial activism192 and has argued that judicial 
restraint is (almost) always a virtue. 193 Thus, he uses the text and, where 
it is not clear, tradition as a default rule to limit judicial discretion and to 
empower traditional majoritarian decision making. 
188 See GERHARDT & RowE, supra note 4, at 213-44 (describing and excerpting 
commentaries on constitutional interpretation and adjudication from such varied con-
servative jurists, scholars, and commentators as Judge Robert Bork, Justice Antonin 
Scalia, Professor Richard Epstein, Professor Stephen Macedo, Gary McDowell, Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor, Judge Richard Posner, Professor Harry Jaffa, and then-
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Chairman Clarence Thomas); see also 
Kannar, supra note 19, at 1347 (suggesting that liberals after the New Deal initially 
viewed textualism as "idiosyncratic" in "the era of Hugo Black" and later as an 
"inherently reactionary" response of conservatives to the liberals' increasing efforts to 
"realiz[e] their agendas through succeeding volumes of the U.S. Reports"). 
189 See BERNARD ScHWARTZ, THE NEw RIGHT AND THE CoNSTITUTION: TuRN-
ING BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK passim (1990) (describing the critiques of and 
responses to the jurisprudence of the Burger Court by various conservative jurists, 
scholars, and commentators throughout the 1980s); Earl Maltz, The Prospects for a 
Revival of Conservative Activism in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REv. 629 
(1990) (same). 
190 See GERHARDT & RowE, supra note 4, at 213-14 (describing the conflicts 
among contemporary conservatives). 
191 For Chief Justice Rehnquist's views on constitutional interpretation, see Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693 (1976); 
see also David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. 
REv. 293 (1976) (surveying the Chief Justice's first four years on the Court and posit-
ing that he would, whenever possible, resolve conflicts between individuals and gov-
ernment in favor of the government). 
192 See Izenberg, supra note 18 (quoting Justice Scalia as distinguishing between 
"activist" judges and those, like himself, who exercise "judicial restraint"). 
193 Cf. Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser of Two Evils, supra note 10, at 863: 
The practical defects of originalism are defects more appropriate for the task at 
hand-that is, less likely to aggravate the most significant weakness of the system 
of judicial review and more likely to produce results acceptable to all. If one is 
hiring a reference-room librarian, and has two applicants, between whom the 
only substantial difference is that the one's normal conversational tone tends to 
be too loud and the other's too soft, it is pretty clear which of the imperfections 
should be preferred. 
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Indeed, Justice Scalia's reliance on tradition as a supplement to the 
constitutional text is consistent with his unique understanding of the rule 
of stare decisis as "the general principle that settled practices and expec-
tations in a democratic society should generally not be disturbed by the 
courts."194 These positions seem to treat the will of the majority rather 
than the text as the ultimate source of legitimacy and authority for the 
Constitution and judicial review. 
Yet, Justice Scalia has also argued that judicial intervention with demo-
cratic institutions may be justified if undertaken pursuant to a clear con-
stitutional mandate, 195 provided the Court does not transgress its 
institutional competence.196 In Justice Scalia's view, the judiciary is 
tempted to apply nonoriginalist principles, which inevitably lead it away 
from the Constitution's true meaning-respect for democratic institutions 
and tradition.197 Thus, the critical elements of Justice Scalia's conserva-
tism are his profound trust in democratic institutions and his correspond-
ing distrust in the federal judiciary. 
It is obvious, however, that in interpreting the Constitution Justice 
Scalia relies on more than just the constitutional text and its original 
meaning. He also relies on "societal traditions" as illuminating whether 
various constitutional provisions embody specific individual guaran-
tees.198 Moreover, in affirmative action cases he has openly sympathized 
with immigrants or immigrant children like himself.199 In addition, 
emboldened by concerns about the long history of judicial abuse of dis-
cretion, Justice Scalia has taken the position that even when the Constitu-
tion might provide a basis on which the Court could protect an interest, 
the Court should not intervene unless the Constitution clearly grants it 
the authority to do so and the timing or circumstances are appropriate for 
such intervention. Thus, for Justice Scalia, case or controversy require-
ments, particularly with respect to standing and justiciability, take on a 
194 Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2614 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
195 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
196 See supra notes 25-26, 56, 154 and accompanying text. 
197 See Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, supra note 10, at 852-56. 
198 Kannar, supra note 19, at 1319 n.113 (quoting Dixon, BC Press Grills Scalia, 
THE KrNGSMAN (Brooklyn College student newspaper), Oct. 23, 1985, at 5 (quoting 
Justice Scalia)). 
199 See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (defending "unknown, unaffluent and unorganized" workers whose interests 
he feels are ignored by proponents of affirmative action); see also Antonin Scalia, The 
Disease as Cure: "In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of 
Race", 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147,152 (denouncing "the Wisdoms and the Powells and 
the Whites," whose ancestors participated in the oppression of African-Americans 
and who, in his view, now seek to rectify the effects of that oppression at the expense 
of newer immigrants through affirmative action). 
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far greater importance than they ever had for Justice Black.200 Justice 
Scalia views these requirements as imposing critical limitations on the 
timing and conditions under which the Court may interfere with 
majoritarian decisions, even when the Constitution might provide some 
textual authority for such interference. Also, the Court might still have 
to refrain from striking down a law to avoid overenforcing a constitu-
tional norm201 or to respect democratic institutions and their longstand-
ing practices.202 
Two further illustrations aptly underscore the link between the Justices' 
textualism and their concerns about judicial activism and restraint. These 
examples demonstrate that both Justices have grounded their approaches 
to constitutional interpretation in their personal opinions about judicial 
activism or restraint rather than in the text or original meaning. 
First, Justice Scalia's effective nullification of the Free Exercise Clause 
in Smith flowed from his concern about the consequences of judicial 
overenforcement of that particular constitutional norm.203 His failure in 
20° Compare Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735 (1993) Goining the major-
ity opinion that found that challenges to the removal process for federal judges pose 
nonjusticiable, political questions) and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 
2145 (1992) (citations omitted): 
The question presented here is whether the public interest in proper administra-
tion of the laws ... can be converted into an individual right by a statute that 
denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens ... to sue. If the concrete 
injury requirement [for standing] has the separation-of-powers significance we 
have always said, the answer must be obvious: To permit Congress to convert the 
undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law 
into an "individual right" vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to trans-
fer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important consti-
tutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 
with BLACK, A CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 6, at 20: 
I think determining when a judge shall decide a constitutional question calls for 
an exercise of sound judicial judgment in a particular case which should not be 
hobbled by general and abstract judicial maxims created to deny litigants their 
just deserts [sic] in a court of law, perhaps when they need the court's help most 
desperately. Consequently, if it is judicial activism to decide a constitutional 
question which is actually involved in a case when it is in the public interest and 
in the interest of a sound judicial system to decide it, then I am an "activist" in 
that kind of case and shall, in all probability, remain one. In such circumstances I 
think "judicial self-restraint" is not a virtue but an evil. 
201 In Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), Justice Scalia 
explained: 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation [of free exercise of religious 
practices] to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those reli-
gious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence 
of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each con-
science is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all 
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 
202 See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text. 
203 See supra notes 150-54, 201 and accompanying text. 
1994] A TALE OF TWO TEXTUALISTS 61 
that case to demonstrate any connection between the text or the original 
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause and his substantive position that the 
Court should not apply heightened scrutiny to "neutral, generally appli-
cable laws" burdening religious practices led Justice Souter to urge the 
Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah to 
"reexamine" Smith because it conflicted with "the precedent on which it 
was rested [as well as the] text of the Free Exercise Clause and its ori-
gins."204 Rather than respond to this criticism by providing textual and 
historiographical analyses of the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, 
Justice Scalia conceded that "[t]he terms 'neutrality' and 'general applica-
bility' are not to be found within the First Amendment itself, of course, 
but are used in [Smith] and earlier cases."205 
Justice Black, however, accepted judicial activism in enforcing explicit 
guarantees, particularly freedom of speech. This led him to argue that, 
rather than drawing relatively arbitrary lines between protected and 
unprotected verbal or written expressions, the Court should treat all 
forms of speech the same for purposes of the First Amendment and con-
sequently strike down any law that abridged any kind of verbal or written 
expression or discourse.206 Thus, although the specter of judicial man-
gling of the text moved Justice Black to favor overenforcement of free-
dom of speech, Justice Scalia preferred to risk legislative 
underenforcement of the textual guarantee of free exercise of religion to 
the prospect of overenforcement of a constitutional norm. 
Second, in Takings Clause207 cases, Justices Black and Scalia have 
reversed their positions from those described above. For example, in 
United States v. Causby,208 Justice Black dissented to the Court's holding 
"that the Government ha[d] 'taken' respondents' property by repeatedly 
flying Army bombers directly above respondents' land at a height ... 
where the light and noise from these planes caused respondents to lose 
sleep and their chickens to be killed."209 Justice Black rejected the 
Court's "imposition of relatively absolute constitutional barriers."210 
Rather than basing his opinion on the relevant text or on the original 
meaning, he asserted that the technological advances in air travel created 
complex problems not suited to the application of rigid constitutional 
restraints and incapable of adequate resolution by courts, which lack the 
requisite techniques and personnel.211 Having abandoned his customary 
204 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2248 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part). 
205 Id. at 2239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
206 See BLACK, A CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 6, at 46-47. 
207 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: "[N)or shaH private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. 
208 328 u.s. 256 (1946). 
209 Id. at 268 (Black, J., dissenting). 
210 ld. at 269. 
211 Id. at 274-75. 
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confidence in the judiciary's ability to define the "absolute" limitations 
embodied in constitutional guarantees, Justice Black concluded that 
Causby "open[ s a] wedge for an unwarranted judicial interference with 
the power of Congress to develop solutions for new and vital national 
problems. "212 
In sharp contrast, Justice Scalia has urged the Court to take a more 
aggressive role in enforcing the Takings Clause. For example, in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Counci/,213 he wrote the Court's opinion, which 
held that South Carolina had violated the Takings Clause by prohibiting 
construction of any permanent habitable structures on certain ocean-
front property. Justice Scalia based this holding on his view that the Tak-
ings Clause requires just compensation "when the owner of real property 
has been [required by the government] to sacrifice all economically bene-
ficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property 
economically idle."214 
Given Justice Scalia's willingness to embrace a strong interventionist 
role for the judiciary in Lucas-in sharp conflict with his usual distrust of 
judicial activism-one would have expected him to have provided a 
detailed accounting of the support for his position from the text, original 
meaning, and tradition. Yet, Justice Scalia did no such thing. His only 
comment on the relevant text was in a footnote in which he merely 
asserted that "the text of the Clause can be read to encompass regulatory 
as well as physical deprivations. "215 He also failed to cite any original 
understanding supporting his position. Moreover, he rejected all early 
American experience, prior to and after the passage of the Bill of Rights, 
and any case law prior to 1897 as "entirely irrelevant" in determining 
"the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause."216 Instead, Jus-
tice Scalia relied primarily on a line of post-1922 precedents, conflicting 
with the earlier 130 year-old understanding of the Court and of the public 
that a "taking" consists "only [of] a 'direct appropriation' of property."217 
Nor did he explain in any meaningful detail why the Court's apparent 
understanding of the Takings Clause over the past sixty years more accu-
rately reflects a tradition of constitutional significance than the Court's 
understanding of the same subject matter prior to 1922. Rather, Justice 
Scalia merely asserted without further analysis that his deviation from the 
early understanding of takings was "consistent with our 'takings' jurispru-
dence, which has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our 
citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle 
212 /d. at 275. 
213 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
214 /d. at 2895 (footnote omitted). 
215 ld. at 2900 n.15. 
216 ld. 
217 /d. at 2892 (citation omitted). 
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of rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to property."218 Conse-
quently, Justice Scalia ironically opened himself to attack from Justice 
Blackmun in Lucas for not having any "clear and accepted 'historical 
compact' or 'understanding of our citizens'" supporting his position and 
for regarding "history as a grab-bag of principles, to be adopted where 
they support the Court's theory, and ignored where they do not."219 
V. THE Pouncs OF TEXTUALISM 
The failures of Justices Black and Scalia to stick strictly to the constitu-
tional text expose a conceivable problem with textualism in general. Jus-
tices Black and Scalia may not be bad textualists. Rather, the problem 
with their approaches to constitutional interpretation may be with textu-
alism itself. Textualism arguably denies the inevitability or necessity of 
relying on moral or political judgments outside the constitutional text to 
make sense of it in constitutional adjudication. 
The textual provisions at issue in constitutional adjudication are usually 
susceptible to more than one reasonable construction, at which point an 
interpreter must refer to something else to settle the ambiguity of the 
relevant text.220 In confronting ambiguous text, an interpreter must 
choose the appropriate level of generality at which to state the constitu-
tional norm at its core.221 In making this choice, the interpreter must be 
guided by something. Textual ambiguity makes this choice possible. And 
it makes relying solely on the text for guidance impractical. The critical 
218 /d. at 2899. Yet another telling aspect of Lucas for Justice Scalia may have 
been his finding that the plaintiff in Lucas had standing in spite of his failure to show 
that he had any intention to build any structure on his property or that he had 
exhausted his right to apply for a special permit to "regain ... beneficial use of his 
land." /d. at 2892. This approach contrasts not only with Justice Scalia's position on 
standing in Lujan, see discussion supra note 200 and accompanying text, but also with 
the traditional prudential rule against the Court's deciding constitutional issues 
"unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2886,2918 
(citation omitted). 
219 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2917 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's position on 
takings also contrasts sharply with his support for regulations he otherwise has 
claimed the Court wrongly invalidated through economic due process. See supra note 
72 and accompanying text. 
22° Cf. Richard A. Posner, What Am /? A Potted Plant?, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 
1987, at 24: 
Many provisions of the Constitution ... are drafted in general terms. This cre-
ates flexibility in the face of unforeseen changes, but it also creates the possibility 
of multiple interpretations, and this possibility is an embarrassment for a theory 
of judicial legitimacy that denies that judges have any right to exercise discretion. 
A choice among semantically plausible interpretations of a text, in circumstances 
remote from those contemplated by its drafters, requires the exercise of discre-
tion and the weighing of consequences. 
221 See RoNALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGIITS SERIOUSLY 135-36 (1977). 
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debate in constitutional adjudication is not about whether the constitu-
tional text is binding.222 Instead, it is about the propriety of the prem-
ise-or guiding principle-of one's constitutional interpretation, which 
inevitably turns on one's moral or political judgments regarding the 
proper role of federal courts in our society.223 Nor is it possible, as a 
general matter, for a judge confronted with an interpretive question to 
ignore completely the influence of his or her professional and personal 
experience and character on his or her judgments about judicial activism 
or restraint.224 In other words, textualism might fail in practice because· it 
arguably cannot fully escape the natural human impulse to interpret texts 
consistent with (or at least with some sensitivity to) one's political or 
moral experience and disposition. 
The mistake of textualists such as Justices Black and Scalia is that they 
have failed to acknowledge the degree to which they have reached 
beyond the text to premises that they have not fully disclosed and that 
may not be fully linked to the text. Constitutional theory aims to clarify 
the nature of these premises and to assess the coherence and consistency 
of the arguments based on them.225 Textualists, or at least the two most 
222 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 760 (2d ed. 1991) 
("Almost everyone believes that the text of the Constitution is binding and that it 
must be interpreted. Usually the principle point of disagreement is whether the origi-
nal understanding of the text is decisive or nearly so and, if it is, how that understand-
ing should be characterized."); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 469, 472 (1981) ("Each theory claims to provide the most illuminating 
account of what our actual constitutional tradition ... 'comes to' .... So the thesis, 
that a useful distinction can be made between theories that insist on and those that 
reject interpretation ... is more confusing than helpful."); Thomas C. Grey, The Con-
stitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1, 1 (1984) ("We are all interpretavists; the real 
arguments are not over whether judges should stick to interpreting [the Constitution], 
but over what they should interpret and what interpretive attitudes they should 
adopt."). 
223 Judge Posner explained that 
[e]ven the decision to read the Constitution narrowly, and thereby "restrain" 
judicial interpretation, is not a decision that can be read directly from the text. 
The Constitution does not say, "Read me broadly," or "Read me narrowly." 
That decision must be made as a matter of political theory, and will depend on 
such things as one's view of the springs of judicial legitimacy and of the relative 
competence of courts and legislatures in dealing with particular types of issues. 
Posner, supra note 220, at 24; see Erwin Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions Get Wrong 
Answers: An Analysis of Professor Carter's Approach to Judicial Review, 66 B.U. L. 
REv. 47,68-69 (1986); Richard Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CaNST. CoM-
MENTARY 57, 60 (1987); Kay, supra note 5, at 203-04; Perry, supra note 5, at 715. 
224 See generally Thshnet, supra note 180, at 752-63. 
225 See Chemerinsky, supra note 223, at 69 (suggesting that because "the judge's 
values [inevitably] enter into the interpretation process," the critical question in con-
stitutional law is whether moral or political values should guide the choice and appli-
cation of a particular constitutional authority). 
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ardent textualists of this century, have failed to acknowledge or fully 
explain the premises apart from the text on which they are relying. 
Another possible limitation on textualism relates to the nature of con-
stitutional adjudication. On a collegial court, such as the Supreme Court, 
the need to maintain coalitions may make it impossible to reach agree-
ment on all of the premises underlying a particular result, much less the 
results in a series of cases.226 In all fairness, Justices Black and Scalia may 
have been prevented at times from fully explaining the premises of their 
decision making because doing so would have risked further fracturing of 
a fragile coalition. Nevertheless, the credibility of the two Justices' persis-
tent claims that they have adhered more closely than any other justices to 
the constitutional text is threatened by their more than occasional failures 
to explain how their decisions seem more consistent with some undis-
closed premise pertaining to a moral or political view of the propriety of 
judicial activism than with the text itself. It is reasonable to expect textu-
alists to demonstrate how they have routinely stuck to the text to the 
exclusion of all else. Otherwise, it is not unreasonable to think, particu-
larly when factors outside the text seem better to explain actual decisions, 
that textualism inadequately explains constitutional adjudication. 
CONCLUSION 
The comparison between Justices Black and Scalia is long overdue. 
More than any other justices in this century, they have insisted on judicial 
fidelity to the plain or original meaning of the constitutional text. This 
common emphasis has led them both to urge overruling decisions, to 
adopt bright line tests, and to reach similar substantive positions, espe-
cially with respect to the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, 
substantive due process, and separation of powers. 
Yet, the comparison reveals a significant problem with Justices Black's 
and Scalia's approaches to constitutional interpretation and with textual-
ism in general. As Professor Philip Kurland has observed, "[y]ou can see 
that although [Justices Black and Scalia] have the same words ... they do 
not come out with the same music. And that must be because there is 
something different in the Constitution for [each] of them, in spite of the 
fact that the words are the same."227 For Justices Black and Scalia that 
"something different" is political and personal judgments regarding the 
appropriate role for the federal judiciary in our society. For Justice 
Black, judicial activism was not wrong per se. It was wrong only when it 
could not be exercised pursuant to a categorical rule grounded in specific 
226 Gerhardt, supra note 5, at 115-16, 137-39. 
227 Professor Philip B. Kurland, Statement at Constitutional Roundtable Before 
the National Commission of Judicial Discipline and Removal (Dec. 18, 1992), 
reprinted in HEARINGS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JuDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND 
REMOVAL 356 (1993). 
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constitutional text or in its original meaning. Thus, he argued that the 
Bill of Rights provided absolute limits on the federal and state govern-
ments, and he enforced those guarantees (as he understood them) to the 
fullest extent possible, regardless of the consequences. While Justice 
Scalia has risked the consequences of aggressive judicial enforcement of 
certain constitutional norms, such as the private property protected by 
the Takings Clause, he has also invariably denounced judicial activism, 
even if there is a constitutional norm derived from the text that a federal 
court could enforce. Hence, he has argued that the federal courts are in 
no better position than legislatures to protect the constitutional right of 
free exercise of religion. 
Moreover, judicial restraint was a virtue for Justice Black, but only 
when the Constitution was silent on the relevant subject matter. Conse-
quently, he refused to find any role for the federal courts in reviewing the 
constitutionality of state legislation affecting marital privacy, economic 
matters, or any other important personal interests not explicitly set aside 
for protection by the constitutional text. While Justice Scalia would 
surely share this position with respect to interests not explicitly protected 
in the text, he has argued that judicial restraint is important for its own 
sake and acts as a tie-breaker for cases in which judges do not have clear 
constitutional authorization to proceed. This accounts for his willingness 
to toughen case or controversy requirements. 
Comparing Justices Black and Scalia further reveals that in constitu-
tional law the more things change the more they stay the same. Thus, 
from different political heritages, both Justices have proposed the same 
solution to the persistent problem of reconciling judicial review with 
democratic rule. In doing so, they have acted on their respective political 
and personal judgments about the role of the judiciary. These percep-
tions and practices tell us a lot about textualism, especially that it seems 
to fail to account for the need in constitutional adjudication to make ref-
erence to something apart from the text of the Constitution in order to 
apply it. If it is ever to achieve its stated objective of explaining constitu-
tional interpretation, textualism must clarify the inevitability of a justice's 
development of nonconstitutional premises from which to proceed in 
constitutional adjudication and the unstable relationship between these 
premises and the text of the Constitution. The purpose of constitutional 
theory is to explain these premises, including the degree to which they 
turn on moral or political judgments about the propriety of judicial activ-
ism and restraint. Although none of this is meant to suggest that Justices 
Black's and Scalia's textualism is nonsense, it does mean that thorough 
exploration of these Justices' attitudes toward judicial activism and 
restraint is necessary before students of their jurisprudence can fully 
make sense of the nature and limits of their textualism. 
